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Kurdish responses to imperial decline:
The Kurdish movement and the end of
Ottoman rule in the Balkans (1878 to
1913) Djene Rhys Bajalan 
Abstract
Focusing on the period between 1878 and 1913, this paper seeks to add to the growing literature
highlighting the complexities of identity in the late Ottoman period through an examination of
the attitudes of Kurdish political activists towards the specific question of the dissolution of
Ottoman rule on the Balkan Peninsula. More precisely, it will be argued that, although it is
impossible to identify a single Kurdish response to Ottoman troubles in the Balkans, a survey of
contemporaneous publications indicates that many leading Kurdish public figures of the period,
including those active within the nascent Kurdish movement, regarded Ottoman imperial
collapse as a profoundly negative political development.
Keywords: Kurds; Crete; Balkans; Nationalism; Ottoman Empire; the Balkan Wars.
ABSTRACT IN KURMANJI

Bersivên kurdan bo paşketina împeretoriyê: Tevgera kurdî û dawiya desthilata
Osmanî li Balkanan (1878-1913)
Ev gotar berê xwe dide nivîsînên her zêdetir ên li ser tevliheviya nasnameyê di serdema dawî ya
Osmaniyan de bi rêya tehlîlkirina helwêstên çalakvanên siyasî yên kurd li hember pirsa hilweşîna
desthilata Osmanî li Balkanan, bi taybetî di qonaxa ji 1878 heta 1913an. Bi gotineke deqîqtir, gotar
wê hizrê dide pêş ku herçend xeyrî mumkîn e ku yek bersiveke kurdan ya bi tenê bê destnîşankirin
ji bo kêşeyên Osmaniyan li herêma Balkanan, nirxandineke weşanên hevçerx diyar dike ku gelek
kesayetên naskirî yên kurd, ewên ku di tevgera nûzayî ya kurdî de çalak bûn jî di nav de, hilweşîna
împeretoriya Osmanî wek geşedaneke gelek negatîv didîtin.
ABSTRACT IN SORANI

Bersivî Kurd bo pukanewey împirator: Cullanewey Kurdî û kotayî ḧukimrranîy
'Usmanî le Balkan (1878-1913)
Be terkîz kirdine ser mawey nêwan 1878 ta 1913, em babete hewll dedat îzafeyek bixate ser ew
edebiyate rû le ziyadbuwey ke tîşk dexate ser allozîy şunas le kota qonaẍî 'Usmanîda le rêgey
pişkinînî hellwêstî çalakwane siyasîye kurdîyekan le hember pirsêkî diyarîkiraw ke ewîş
hellweşandinewey ḧukmî 'Usmanîyekan le durgey Ballkane. Wirdtir billêyn, argumêntî ewe dekirêt
ke herçende destnîşankirdinî yek bersivî Kurdî derheq be kêşekanî 'Usmanîyekan le Balkan
esteme, rûmallkirdinî billawkirawekanî ew serdeme amajey ewe dedat ke zorêk le kesayetîye giştîye
diyarekanî kurdî ew kat, be waneşewe ke lenaw bizûtnewe kurdîye sawakeda çalak bûn, heresî
împiratorîyetî 'Usmanîyan be allugorrêkî siyasîy nerênîy qull dadena.
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ABSTRACT IN ZAZAKI

Rijîyayîşê Împeratorîye rê cewabê kurdan: Balkanan de peynîya hukmê
Osmanîyan de tevgerê kurdan (1878 – 1913)
Bi giranîya serranê mabênê 1878 û 1913î, na meqale kena ke dewrê Osmanîyan ê peyênî de
edebîyato ke derheqê kompleksîteyanê nasnameyan ê Balkanan de aver şono, ey ser o kemerêke
rono. Tede derheqê persê wedarîyayîşêhukmê Osmanîyan ê nêmgirawa Balkanî de qenaetê
çalakîkeranê sîyasetmedaranê kurdan ê wextî analîz benê. Hîna biteferuat, îdîa beno ke herçiqas
ke mumkîn nîyo ke derheqê problemanê Osmanîyan ê Balkanî de tena yew cewabê kurdan bêro
teşxîskerdene, ancîya cigêrayîşê weşanê ê demî musneno ke xeylê şexsîyetanê kurdan ê namdaran
yê ê wextî, çalakîkerê tevgerê neteweperwerîya kurdan ya tezîye zî tede, parçebîyayîşê
Împeratorîya Osmanîyan sey averşîyayîşêko sîyasîyo xirabin dîyêne.

Introduction
Today in order to [maintain] the territorial integrity and continued political life of
our [Ottoman] state, whatever degree of need exists to keep Rumelia in hand, the
region of Kurdistan feels the same degree of seriousness and need.
Abdurrahman Bedirhan, Kürdistan, 19011
In recent years, the history of the late Ottoman Empire and the role of
nationalism in its eventual demise has undergone considerable revisions. In the
past, growing “nationalist” sentiment amongst the various subject peoples of
the Ottoman Turks was often highlighted as one of the primary factors behind
imperial collapse. This tendency is perhaps understandable considering the
prevalence of nationalistic historical writing, which often presents the late
Ottoman period as a prelude to a series of distinct national histories. Indeed,
for some historians the central question of late Ottoman history was not the
empire’s demise but the fact “that it survived as long as it did” (Ahmad, 2005:
5). In contrast, newer studies have sought to nuance our understanding of the
relationship between the growing significance of the national question (or
perhaps more accurately national questions) in Ottoman affairs and imperial
collapse (Reynolds, 2011a; Der Matossian, 2014). This revisionist élan is
particularly evident in studies that have focused on the predominantly Muslim
peoples of the Ottoman Empire (Kayalı, 1997; Gawrych, 2006; Bozarslan,
2016; Provence, 2017). Consequently a more complex historical narrative has
emerged, one which recognises that, although the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries witnessed the appearance of movements seeking to
represent the interests of one or other of the empire’s “national” communities,
growing national consciousness did not necessarily imply a rejection of the
Ottoman order. It is within the context of these broader historiographical
Abdurrahman Bedirhan, “Hamidiye Süvari Alayları” Kürdistan (14th September 1901). Unless otherwise
stated, all translations are the author’s own.
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debates that this article seeks to examine the Kurdish response to imperial
decline and, more precisely, the degeneration of the Ottoman Empire’s hold on
its European territories. Chronologically, it focusses on the tumultuous period
between the end of the Russo-Ottoman War in 1878 and the conclusion of the
Second Balkan War in the summer of 1913, a period which coincided with the
development of the first modern forms of Kurdish political activism.
At first glance, examining the reactions of the Kurds to the decline of the
Ottoman Empire in Europe might seem a somewhat bizarre undertaking.
Although the majority of the Middle East’s Kurdish population resided within
the Ottoman Empire, their historic homeland Kurdistan2 lay at the opposite
end of the Ottoman imperium, far to the east on the border with Persia. Yet,
the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman’s once vast European domain and
the concurrent establishment of a series of Christian nation-states were
developments with implications far beyond South Eastern Europe. Indeed, the
changing political order on the Balkan peninsula and the fate of the Ottoman
“sickman of Europe” emerged as one of the central questions of nineteenthcentury Great Power diplomacy. As might be expected, the gradual collapse of
Ottoman rule in South Eastern Europe, a process which culminated in the
Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, was a subject that also excited great interest
amongst members of the Ottoman intellectual and political elite (Anderson,
1966; Kent, 1996; Çiçek; 2010). This included a growing number of public
figures of Kurdish origins.
Of course, the Kurdish response to imperial collapse was by no means uniform.
Although between 1878 and 1913 Kurdish elites increasingly envisaged the
Kurdish community as a “nation”, the political implications of this realisation
varied greatly. Indeed, it is necessary to emphasise that the Kurdish movement
in the late Ottoman period was neither homogeneous in terms of its ideological
outlook nor in an organisational sense. There were certainly those who regarded
the Kurds’ future as lying in an autonomous or even independent Kurdish
nation-state, such as the religious scholar and poet, Hacı Kadir-i Koyi, and the
Russophile Kurdish aristocrat, Abdürrezzak Bedirhan. However, other Kurdish
public figures took a different stance, seeking to advance Kurdish national

The term “Kurdistan” here is used as shorthand for those Ottoman provinces in Eastern Anatolia and
Mesopotamia with considerable Kurdish populations. It does not imply that the region was exclusively
inhabited by Kurds. Those regions claimed by Kurdish nationalists as constituting “Greater Kurdistan”
overlap with lands claimed by Armenian nationalists as part of “Armenia”. Within the Ottoman context, the
term Kurdistan was used as a provincial designation between 1847 and 1867 (Eyalet-i Kürdistan). However,
the province did not include all Kurdish-populated areas. A considerable Kurdish population resided further
to the south in the Ottoman province of Mosul, as well as in areas further to the east under Iranian
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the term “Kurdistan” (Kürdistan) as well as “Ottoman Kurdistan” (Kürdistan-ı
Osmani) and “Iranian Kurdistan” (Kürdistan-ı Acemi) were used in Ottoman political and administrative
discourse as a broader geo-ethnic toponym describing the areas of Kurdish settlement. See Akpınar and
Bozkurt (2011).
2
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interests within the framework of the Ottoman system (Klein, 1996; Özoğlu,
2004; Bajalan, 2016). This included those at the forefront of an emergent
Kurdish political activism in the Ottoman Empire, such as the founders of the
first Kurdish newspaper Kürdistan (Kurdistan), published between 1898 and
1902, as well as those involved in Kurdish associations such as Kürd Teavün ve
Terakki Cemiyeti (The Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress, KSMP),
active between 1908 and 1909, and the Kürd Talebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti (Kurdish
Students’ Hope Society, KSHS) active between 1912 and 1914. Consequently,
it will be argued here that, through a review of Kürdistan, as well as the
publications produced by the KSMP and KSHS, it becomes apparent that a
small but influential section of the Kurdish intellectual elite, one at the vanguard
of Kurdish activism, regarded the breakdown of Ottoman rule in the Balkans
not as an opportunity but as a calamity of great magnitude.

Kurdish nationalists and imperial decline
The dissolution of the Ottomans’ Balkan empire pre-dates the first glimmerings
of Kurdish nationalism in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Indeed,
rebellions, inter-communal violence, and European intervention were recurrent
themes in Ottoman affairs throughout the century. The outcome, as already
noted, was the gradual replacement of Ottoman rule with a series of distinct
nation-states, the first of which was Greece which won formal independence
in 1829. The path to self-rule for other peoples in the region was somewhat
slower, often passing through a stage of autonomy before full independence.
In this regard, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 was of particular
importance with respect to the fate of the Balkans.3 The Ottoman defeat,
confirmed in the Treaty of Berlin (1878), forced the empire to concede the
formal independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania. The treaty also
created Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia as autonomous provinces under
Ottoman suzerainty as well as handing the administration of BosniaHerzegovina and Cyprus to Austria-Hungary and Great Britain respectively.
Although primarily focused on Europe, the treaty also had direct implications
for the Kurds. Russia annexed three strategically important eastern provinces,
Batumi, Ardahan and Kars, while Iran was awarded the Kurdish-populated
border district of Qotur (in present-day West Azerbaijan province). In addition,
the treaty included an article which provided an international guarantee to

Following rebellions in Bosnia and Bulgaria as well as a series of failed negotiations, Russia declared war on
the Ottoman Empire in April 1877. This was followed by offensives in both the Balkans and Eastern
Anatolia. Despite dogged Ottoman resistance, most notably at the fortress of Plevna in modern-day Bulgaria,
Ottoman forces were soundly defeated. In March 1878, Russia imposed the harsh treaty of San Stefano on
the Ottomans. However, following objections from Great Britain, the treaty was scrapped in favor of a new
less onerous peace agreement, the Treaty of Berlin, signed in July 1878. See Barry (2012) as well as the volume
edited by Yavuz and Sluglett (2011).
3
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protect the region’s Armenian population from “Kurdish and Circassian”
tribesmen.4
The Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 thus provides
important context for the first glimmerings of Kurdish nationalism. Although
prior to the 1870s separatist nationalism was primarily restricted to Ottoman
Christians, the scale of the Ottoman defeat caused some amongst the Ottoman
Muslim population to question the future viability of the empire. For instance,
in 1878 Albanian patriots established the League of Prizren which developed
into a movement for Albanian independence, although it was ultimately
suppressed by the Ottoman government in the early 1880s. Significantly, this
nationalism was primarily a reaction to Ottoman diplomatic failures at Berlin as
well as to Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian efforts to partition the Albanian
homeland rather than any pervading sense of Ottoman-Turkish “oppression”
(Skendi, 1953; Gawrych, 2006: 38-71). In a similar vein, the early 1880s
witnessed an unsuccessful Kurdish uprising, led by Sheikh Ubeydullah of
Nehri, which sought to challenge both Ottoman and Iranian authority over
Kurdistan. Although the nationalist credentials of this revolt have been a topic
of significant scholarly debate, recent studies on the subject, based on a more
extensive review of Ottoman and Kurdish sources, have suggested that the
Sheikh’s rebellion also contained a nationalist element as his objective seems to
have been to create a unified Kurdish state encompassing both Ottoman and
Iranian Kurdistan (Ateş, 2014; Soleimani, 2016).
Ultimately, although the Sheikh Ubeydullah revolt did not mark the beginning
of a sustained nationalist resistance to Ottoman rule, it did signal the beginning
of a new phase in Ottoman Kurdish politics, one that was increasingly shaped
by the notion that the Kurds constituted a “nation”. However, the gradual
growth of Kurdish national consciousness in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century did not result in the formation of a unified political
movement nor did it imply a unified attitude towards the fate of the Ottoman
Empire. From its very beginning, the Kurdish movement contained within it
both a separatist-nationalist wing as well as what might be termed an
“accommodationalist” wing, namely those who sought to advance Kurdish
interests within the framework of the Ottoman polity.
In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid
II (r. 1876-1909) adopted policies that sought both to emphasise the Islamic
characteristics and heritage of the empire as well as to actively favour powerful

Article LXI of the Treaty of Berlin stated: “The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further
delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the
Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known
the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.” See Hurewitz (1975:
414).
4
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Kurdish interests both within the imperial bureaucracy and at a provincial level
(Duguid, 1973; Kodaman, 1987; Çetinsaya, 1999; Klein, 2011). To a certain
degree, these policies were a success in that they served to foster connections
between Kurdish elites and the Ottoman state, personified by the sultan
himself. Moreover, the Hamidian regime, drawing parallels with the situation in
the Balkans, was also keen to assert the “Kurdish” character of its eastern
provinces5 in the face of a rising tide of nationalism and political agitation
amongst the Kurds’ predominately Christian neighbours, the Armenians.6
Indeed, British diplomat Sir Charles Eliot, an astute commentator on Ottoman
affairs, observed that “all maps marking any district as Armenistan are
confiscated…” and that, despite the fact that “in many parts of Asia Minor the
population is mixed… the Turks prefer to call such districts Kurdistan.” His
conclusions concerning Ottoman suspicions were quite accurate.
“Foreigners…”, he noted, “were talking of Armenia as they had once talked of
Bulgaria. The Turks thought that there was a clear intention to break up what
remained of the Ottoman Empire and found an Armenian kingdom” (Eliot,
1900: 383-384 & 401).
Thus, schemes such as the Hamidiye light cavalry, a militia established in 1890
which recruited primarily from amongst the Kurdish tribes, served both to
secure the loyalty of Kurdish tribal leaders as well as to counterbalance growing
Armenian militancy. Indeed, the sultan was willing to indulge a significant
degree of lawlessness amongst loyal tribes, standing by in the mid-1890s as
Kurds, including those enrolled in the Hamidiye, engaged in a series of pogroms
and land seizures primarily directed against the region’s Armenian community
(Klein, 2011; Astourian, 2011).
The sultan’s patronage and indulgence of powerful Kurdish interests earned
him, at least in some quarters, the title of Bavê Kurdan (“Father of the Kurds”)
(van Bruinessen, 1992: 186). However, not all Kurds looked on the regime
positively. One such critic was Hacı Kadir-i Koyi (1815-1897), a poet educated

Sultan Abdülhamid II drew explicit parallels between Ottoman territorial decline and the fate of Kurdistan.
In a memorandum from the palace to the office of the Grand Vizier, he noted that: “Of a certain locality,
whose inhabitants are predominantly Kurdish, and whose name came to be known as Kurdistan since ancient
times, some malignant mouths have been talking of it as Armenia. Though these ill intentions are cast with
the purpose of creating an Armenia, just the way used in earlier formations of the Danube, i.e., a certain
principle was established to determine [certain] boundaries; the locality known as Kurdistan is there today,
and the Muslim folk inhabiting it are incomparably more numerous than Armenians. Consequently, it is not
at all right to change the name of this locality to Armenia, and furthermore, it is not at all possible to draw
boundaries that would include all Armenian localities, under the heading ‘provinces inhabited by
Armenians.’” First Chamberlain to Prime Ministry (1 August 1890) reproduced in Ökte (1989).
6 As early as 1878, the Armenian patriarch, Nerses Varjabedian, had approached the Great Powers in Berlin
in order to secure Armenian autonomy in the east and, over the ensuing decades, a number of nationalistic
Armenian organisations emerged, including the Hunchakian (The Bell) and Dashnaktsutyun (The Armenian
Revolutionary Federation). Although initially their activities were limited, they gradually developed the
capability to wage a low-level guerrilla war against Ottoman authorities.
5
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in the madrasas of Southern Kurdistan and who later served as a tutor to
perhaps the most influential Kurdish family of the late Ottoman period, the
Bedirhans.7 Koyi’s poetry is noteworthy as it constitutes an early manifestation
of Kurdish political nationalism, namely an articulation of the desire for a
Kurdish nation-state (Kurdo, 1985: 18-19; Hakim, 2000: 22-23). Significantly,
in a poem entitled Xakê Cizîra û Bohtan (The Land of Cizre and Bohtan), a
reference to the former fiefdom of the Bedirhans, he writes:
Just yesterday the people of Sudan stood up like lions,
Now they are independent, the envy of all the world,
Bulgarians and Serbs and Greeks, also Armenians and Montenegrins,
All five do not number as many as the Babans,8
Each one is independent, all and each are states,
Possessors of army and banners, general staffs and field staffs,
It is their right, the Armenians; they are with good deeds,
They are not like us, making claim on each other with swords,
For the science of war and industry, for the bonding of the nation,
They send both their young and old to Europe (Koyi, 2004: 85-86).
In short, he looked to the Christian nations of the Balkans as well as Armenians
as a source of inspiration, calling on the Kurds to follow their example by taking
control of their own affairs and charting out their own destiny as an
independent nation.
Hacı Kadir-i Koyi’s nationalism was somewhat of an outlier during the
Hamidian period and, as we shall see, even those who admired Koyi’s work,
such as the founders of Kürdistan, Mikdat Midhat Bedirhan and Abdurrahman
Bedirhan, rejected the separatist aspect of his message. This is perhaps
understandable considering the pro-Kurdish tilt of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s
Eastern policy. Moreover, despite its inauspicious beginning, the Hamidian
regime was largely able to fend off further territorial decline. There were
certainly setbacks. In 1881, European pressure forced the empire to cede
Thessaly to Greece and, four years later, in 1885, the Ottoman government was
unable to halt the unification of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria. Indeed, despite

The Bedirhans were, until the mid-nineteenth century, the hereditary rulers of the Cizre-Bohtan emirate,
one of a number of Kurdish principalities that had been subject to the Ottoman throne since the early
sixteenth century. Although more properly known as the Azizan, the family takes its name from Bedirhan
Bey who had sought (unsuccessfully) to resist Ottoman centralisation efforts in the 1840s. Bedirhan Bey was
ultimately defeated and removed from office in 1846. He was subsequently exiled to Crete before being
allowed to move to Damascus where he died in 1868. Despite his exile, Bedirhan was treated with great
respect and his sons were integrated into the imperial elite.
8 The Babans were the former ruling clan of the eponymous principality centred on the city of Suleimani.
Although the Babans’ rule ended in 1851, like the Bedirhans, the family remained a prestigious and influential
family within the broader Ottoman elite.
7
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scoring an impressive military victory over Greece in 1897, in a war that had
been precipitated by ongoing Greek agitation on the island of Crete, European
intervention forced the Ottomans to grant the island autonomy. Nevertheless,
the regime was able to ward off European efforts to intervene in the internal
affairs of Ottoman Macedonia.
Ultimately, Sultan Abdülhamid II’s autocratic regime was brought to an end by
a military uprising that resulted in the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution
of 1876, which the sultan had suspended barely a year after he had consented
to its promulgation. Yet, despite the hopes of the revolutionaries, the pace of
Ottoman territorial decline in the Balkans quickened following the July 1908
Constitutional Revolution. Within months of the revolution and the restoration
of constitutional rule, the Ottoman government faced major diplomatic
setbacks with Austria-Hungary’s formal annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on
4 October 1908, followed a day later by the Bulgarian declaration of
independence. At the same time, the new administration in Istanbul had to
contend with attempts by the Greek-dominated autonomous administration in
Crete to enact a union with Greece. However, worse was to come. While the
Ottomans were attempting to stave off the Italian invasion of Tripolitania
(1911) as well as bring to an end a rebellion in Albania, the Balkan League, an
alliance made up of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Romania, struck.
The First Balkan War (1912-1913) proved disastrous for the Ottomans, who
were ejected from Albania, Macedonia, and much of Thrace, territorial losses
that were confirmed at the Treaty of London signed in May 1913. In the
summer of 1913, the Ottomans were able to take advantage of Bulgaria’s
surprise attack on its former allies to retake the one-time Ottoman capital of
Edirne, which had fallen to the Bulgarians in March 1913. Nevertheless, despite
this important symbolic victory, the Balkan Wars had reduced Ottoman Europe
to a small enclave around the imperial capital. Moreover, it precipitated a wave
of Muslim refugees fleeing territories conquered by the Balkan League, a
humanitarian catastrophe that only served to heighten tensions within what
remained of the Ottoman imperium (Çetinkaya, 2015).
From the Kurdish perspective, the years between the 1908 Constitutional
Revolution and the end of the Second Balkan War in August 1913 also
witnessed the emergence of a more significant nationalist challenge to Ottoman
rule in the Kurdish-inhabited east. While educated elements of Kurdish society
generally favoured the reestablishment of constitutional rule in 1908, the
reaction amongst provincial elites, in particular those tribal and religious leaders
who had benefited from Sultan Abdulhamid II’s patronage, was less
enthusiastic. Discontent regarding the intentions of the constitutionalist regime
was only heightened by government efforts to centralise provincial
administration and to reign in the unruliness of the Kurdish tribes, something
the ancien régime had conspicuously failed to do (Klein, 2007).
www.KurdishStudies.net
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The apparent decrepitude of the Ottoman polity only served to amplify growing
Kurdish discontent. Arshak Safrastian, a native of Van in the employ of the
British consular service, observed Ottoman difficulties in Europe helped fuel
disorder amongst the tribes with “robberies in isolated valleys and out-of-theway districts and raiding… [increasing] in proportion to the Turkish defeats in
the Balkans” (Safrastian, 1948: 72). At the same time, the magnitude of
Ottoman defeats in the First Balkan War also led some Kurdish activists to
contemplate a post-Ottoman political order. For example, in March 1913,
shortly before his death, Hüseyin Pasha Bedirhani9 informed the British ViceConsul in Diyarbakır that, should the Ottoman Empire be subject to partition
because of its defeats in the Balkans, he would seek to ensure the establishment
of an independent Kurdistan.10
The potential breakup of the Ottoman Empire in Europe also encouraged more
radical Kurdish activists, most notably a group which coalesced under the
leadership of another member of the extended Bedirhan clan, Abdürrezzak
Bedirhan. Unlike many of his compatriots, including members of his own
family, Abdürrezzak Bedirhan rejected any compromise with the Ottoman
authorities, instead seeking to establish an independent Kurdish state with the
support of the empire’s old enemy, Russia. Abdürrezzak Bedirhan’s career as
an anti-Ottoman agitator in the years leading up to the First World War has
been explored in detail elsewhere (Bedirhan, 2000; Reynolds, 2011b). Between
1911 and 1914, he was involved in several plots to subvert Ottoman rule over
Kurdistan, including the Bitlis Revolt in the spring of 1914, one of the largest
instances of anti-Ottoman unrest in the region since the Sheikh Ubeydullah
Revolt of the 1880s.11
Consequently, Abdürrezzak Bedirhan was keen to use Ottoman military defeats
in the Balkans to his advantage. In a propaganda pamphlet issued in the autumn
of 1913, he proclaimed that, following the Ottoman Empire’s defeats in the
Balkans and North Africa, the European Great Powers were contemplating the
partition of the empire’s Asiatic territories. As evidence of this, he highlighted
the reform package agreed to by the Ottoman government regarding the

Hüseyin Pasha Bedirhani (1859/1860-1913) was a son of Bedirhan Bey. He was born on the island of Crete
and later served in the Ottoman military during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78. Following the end of
the war, he was involved in an attempt to orchestrate a Kurdish rebellion, alongside his brother, Osman
Pasha. Sultan Abdülhamid II’s government subsequently exiled him to Syria where he served as a district
prefect (kaymakam). Following the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, he returned to Kurdistan and became
increasingly opposed to the “Young Turk” regime. See Malmîsanij (2000: 154-170).
10 PRO FO 195/2449, Diyarbakır (8 March 1913).
11 The Bitlis Revolt broke out in the Spring of 1914 when Ottoman authorities attempted to arrest Molla
Selim, a local Kurdish religious leader and political agitator with connections to Abdürrezzak Bedirhan.
Although Abdürrezzak Bedirhan had been attempting to build support for a Kurdish rebellion in the region,
Molla Selim’s arrest precipitated the Kurds to rise earlier than expected. The rebellion was crushed in early
April and its leader, Molla Selim, was forced to take refuge in the Russian consulate, where he remained until
the outbreak of the First World War. See Reynolds (2011a: 78-81).
9
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“Armenian” provinces of the Ottoman Empire, an agreement, which was
ultimately ratified in February 1914.12 He claimed that this European plan for
the reorganisation of “six provinces… under the name of Armenia” would
result in Armenians being granted “special privileges”. Thus he urged his
compatriots to establish “their rights and privileges”, warning that, if they failed
to do so, they would be disarmed and unable “to protect their rights against the
rich but immoral Armenians”.13 Thus, the collapse of Ottoman authority in
Europe was presented as a harbinger of a broader imperial collapse, one that
would, should the Kurds not take action, favour the Christian Armenians.

Kürdistan and the Cretan question
However, not all elements of the Kurdish population viewed the Balkan nations
as exemplars as Koyi had, nor did they perceive the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire as an opportunity, as in the case of Abdürrezzak Bedirhan. Indeed,
many of the pioneers of Kurdish activism during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century also maintained a deep commitment to the continuation of
the Ottoman state. This commitment is perhaps best understood through the
material relationship between members of an emergent Kurdish intellectual and
professional elite, many of whom were also members of prestigious notable
families such as the aforementioned Bedirhan clan. This new “intelligentsia”, a
social group often associated with the rise of nationalism, was relatively well
integrated into Ottoman society, being educated within the empire’s
modernised school system and finding employment within the Ottoman
bureaucracy. Moreover, as already noted, during the reign of Sultan
Abdülhamid II, the regime actively favoured members of the Kurdish elite for
governmental positions, most notably in the case of the Bedirhans. Indeed, it
might be argued that the Bedirhan clan’s ability to play such a prominent role
in the early Kurdish movement was, in part, facilitated by the patronage they
received from the Ottoman state.14 Consequently, the Kurdish intelligentsia’s
political posture towards the empire’s territorial decline differed from that
displayed by figures such as Koyi and Abdürrezzak Bedirhan. This is evident in

Although the Treaty of Berlin (1878) had “internationalised” the Armenian question, divisions amongst
the Great Powers stymied the implementation of the relevant clauses in the treaty. However, in the aftermath
of the Second Balkan War and under heavy European pressure, the Ottoman government signed into law (8
February 1914) a major reform package concerning the “Armenian” provinces of the empire. Two European
officials, a Dutch colonial administrator, Louis C. Westenenk, and a Norwegian officer, Major Nicolai Hoff,
were appointed by the Great Powers as inspector-generals of the “Six Provinces” (Erzurum, Van, Bitlis,
Diyarbakır, Harput, and Sivas). The agreement was ultimately abrogated following the outbreak of the First
World War. See Davison (1948).
13 PRO FO 195/2458, Van (14 February 1914).
14 The Bedirhans’ close relationship with the sultan was widely remarked upon at the time. Sir Charles Eliot
observed that: “Here [in Istanbul] they behaved much as they did in the wilds of Asia Minor, holding
themselves above all law, and defying the representatives of the Government. If they ever obeyed the orders
of anyone less than the Sultan, it was merely from diplomacy and politeness” (Eliot, 1900: 406). For a detailed
history of the Bedirhans and their careers in Ottoman politics see Malmîsanij (2000).
12
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the earliest example of Kurdish journalism, the bi-lingual (Kurdish-Turkish)
newspaper Kürdistan (Kurdistan), published between 1898 and 1902.
Kurdish nationalists and their sympathisers have long regarded the foundation
of Kürdistan by two brothers and members of the Bedirhan clan, Mikdat Midhat
Bedirhan and Abdurrahman Bedirhan, in 1898 as representative of their
“crystallized desire for emancipation” (Blau, 1963: 30). Significantly, Kürdistan
was founded in exile, being first published in British-administered Egypt and
later in Switzerland and Great Britain, and took a hostile editorial line towards
the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. However, while the newspaper
can certainly be regarded as a manifestation of growing “national
consciousness” in a general sense, it was far from being a “nationalist”
publication in the sense of advocating the formation of a Kurdish nation-state.
Indeed, considering the favour with which the Hamidian regime treated the
Kurds (or perhaps more accurately, influential sections of the Kurdish nobility),
the notion that this particular manifestation of Kurdish national consciousness
developed as a direct response to a pervasive sense of “national oppression”
seems unlikely.
In a certain respect, Kürdistan can be regarded as a vehicle through which the
Bedirhan brothers sought to advance their own familial interests in an attempt
to present themselves as the traditional leaders of the Kurdish “nation” and so
an appropriate interface between the imperial state and broader Kurdish
society. However, it can also be seen as part of the constitutionalist opposition
that emerged in response to the sultan’s suspension of the Ottoman
Constitution of 1876. Indeed, a number of individuals of Kurdish origin,
including Kürdistan’s editors, played important roles in the development of the
“constitutionalist” opposition to the regime, better known in Europe at the
time as the “Young Turks” (Klein, 2017).
Despite this moniker, the “Young Turk” movement was in fact made up of
Ottomans from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. Moreover, while
some elements within the movement did display a propensity towards Turkish
nationalist politics, the fundamental goals of the so-called “Young Turks”
remained to replace the autocratic regime of the sultan with a system of
constitutional monarchy based upon the short-lived 1876 Constitution. This,
they believed, would provide a basis for social and political solidarity among all
Ottoman subjects, regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds, and thus
serve to arrest the empire’s apparent decline (Hanioğlu, 1995; 2001). This
“Ottomanist” political platform proved extremely attractive to elements
amongst the Kurdish community alienated by the Hamidian autocracy. In fact,
two Kurds, Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sükuti, were amongst the founders of
the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, CUP), the
largest and most successful faction of the constitutionalist opposition.
Moreover, Kürdistan itself was published with the support of the CUP
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(Malmîsanij, 1986: 15). Ergo, it might be thought of as representing a “Kurdist”
trend within the broader constitutionalist movement.
Consequently, whilst Kürdistan focused on Kurdish affairs, it approached them
from a pro-Ottoman perspective. It highlighted the general need for
constitutional government and its critiques of Ottoman policies in Kurdistan
focused on the actions of the sultan, which in its view, had brought about
conflict and mistrust between the Muslim Kurds and the Christian Armenians
in the region. Indeed, in discussing the anti-Armenian pogroms of the mid1890s, Abdurrahman Bedirhan even conceded that: “In the conflict between
Kurds and Armenians, I know that Kurds killed many innocent Armenians.”15
The editorial line of Kürdistan towards Christian-Muslim relations is significant.
The newspaper’s editors sought to foster cordial relations between the Kurds
and Armenians and to this end the Bedirhans achieved a certain degree of
success with the Armenian revolutionary press praising the brothers’ efforts
(Sarkisian, 1994). For the writers contributing to Kürdistan, the solution to
Kurdish-Armenian and in a broader sense Muslim-Christian tensions was to be
found in inter-communal solidarity or, in Ottoman terms, the “unity of ethnic
and religious elements” (ittihad-i anasar). As one article succinctly put it:
“Whether they are Armenians or Kurds, if they wish to be liberated from these
circumstances and these oppressions, they can [only] achieve success through
unity and alliance.”16 In other words, a common form of Ottoman patriotism
was to frame such an alliance.
However, while endeavouring to build good relations with the Armenians,
Kürdistan displayed great sympathy for the plight of Ottoman Muslims residing
in regions far from the Kurdish homeland. Indeed, the newspaper took the
government to task for what it perceived as a failure in protecting Muslim
interests. This sympathy towards the situation of Ottoman Muslims is nowhere
more apparent than in the newspaper’s treatment of the Cretan question. To a
certain extent, Kürdistan’s focus on Crete might partially be understood in
familial terms, with Mikdat Midhat Bedirhan being born there during his
father’s exile on the island. Still, Kürdistan was outspoken in its criticism of the
Hamidian regime’s weakness in face of a growing threat to imperial sovereignty
over the island presented by Greek nationalism and European intervention.
For example, the paper published an article from Bahriyeli Rıza, a leading
member of the constitutionalist opposition in Egypt, in which the author
condemned the Hamidian regime for losing “the island of Crete which is the
most important part of our homeland.” The article continued by offering a
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Abdurrahman Bedirhan, “Hel Yestewî’llezîne Ye’lemûnewe’llezîne la Ye’lemûne” (1 December 1900).
Anonymous, “Kürdler ve Ermeniler” Kürdistan (14 December 1900).
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narration of events on the island which, while being highly critical of the palace,
showed considerable sympathy with broader Ottoman interests. It noted that:
The Greek government sent troops to our borders and attacked. Our
commander there reported the state of affairs [to the palace] and asked
how to respond. The answer that came was to abstain from any
aggressive action until the final order [from the palace] was given. Two
or three days passed and there was no word of a final order [from the
palace]. However, [in the meantime] the enemy captured a few places on
the border. Our soldiers who were prisoners of inaction to the ‘final
order’ [from the palace], the patience of those brave and patriotic lions
of ours now ran out. Breaking the bonds of the ‘final order’ they attacked
the enemies; by showing themselves as being immune to the treacherous
and criminal orders of the palace, they prove to the world that they are
still the Ottomans of old.17
Bahriyeli Rıza’s sentiments were echoed in other articles as well. In a Kurdishlanguage piece published in November 1898, the author mourned the state of
the Muslims on the island and censured the government for its inaction. It
complained that the European states were supporting Cretan Christians, while
the Ottoman administration had left the Muslims to their fate. Indeed, the
newspaper used highly emotive language in describing the conditions facing
Cretan Muslims, writing:
The circumstances of the Muslims of Crete are extremely bad… Muslims
have become ruined and defenceless. Many of their men have been
killed. Their wives and children have been violated and left hungry. Their
houses have been burned. Infidels took their property and daughters.
Their wives become widows to serve infidels.
Significantly, the article concluded by urging Kurds to pay heed to the situation
in Crete for “one day this situation may befall you as well! Now, wouldn’t it be
a shame for Kurds to see their wives and children in the hands of Russian
soldiers!”18
In summation, in face of direct assaults on Ottoman sovereignty and territorial
integrity, from both the European Great Powers and Greek nationalists,
Kürdistan identified with the Ottoman cause, although it made a distinction
between the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Ottoman polity in a more
abstract sense. This perspective was reinforced by the perception that should
Christian separatists meet with success in one part of the empire such as Crete,
not only would Ottoman Muslim interests be hurt, it could set a precedent for
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Bahriyeli Rıza, “İdare-i Maslahat ve İşar-ı Ahir” Kürdistan (1st February 1900).
Abdurrahman Bedirhan, “Welat-Vatan” Kürdistan (4th November 1898).
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developments in Kurdistan. Thus, not only was the paper unsympathetic to
separatist movements, but it also advocated their suppression going so far as to
condemn the Hamidian regime for failing to take active enough measures to
counter them.

The Constitutional Revolution, Kurdish civil society, and the end
of empire in the Balkans
In many ways, the disposition of Kürdistan towards the Cretan question
prefigured that of later associations and periodicals. In July 1908, a military
rebellion launched by CUP-affiliated officers stationed in the Balkans
precipitated the collapse of the Hamidian autocracy. The 1908 Constitutional
Revolution was an important landmark in not only the history of the late
Ottoman Empire in a general sense, but also in the development and evolution
of the Kurdish movement. The restoration of constitutional rule after over
thirty years of sultanic despotism opened the way for the emergence of a vibrant
civil society. This included a host of organisations seeking to represent the
interests of the various ethnic communities residing in the empire, including
the Kurds. At the forefront of this new phase of Kurdish activism was a cadre
of Kurdish notables, intellectuals, and later, students based in Istanbul, who
took the lead in establishing a succession of Kurdish journals and associations.
The first such association was the KSMP established in the imperial capital
during the autumn of 1908. The organisation remained active for less than a
year, attempting to advance and protect Kurdish interests. Amongst its
objectives, outlined in its constitution, were commitments to work towards
ending tribal infighting, to propagandise in favour of constitutional
government, to encourage education and to promote the material and spiritual
well-being of the Kurds. In short, like Kürdistan, the KSMP approached the
Kurdish question from an Ottomanist perspective. Indeed, the primary
difference between the two was their attitudes towards the existing imperial
regime. Whereas Kürdistan had been critical of the Hamidian regime, the KSMP
and its bulletin regarded the new constitutionalist regime in a positive light.
Indeed, a number of the KSMP’s members maintained close relations with the
CUP, including the organisation’s president Sheikh Abdülkadir Efendi (the son
of Sheikh Ubeydullah), who had been a part of the CUP during years in
opposition, and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Bey, who was elected to the Ottoman
parliament as the CUP-backed deputy for Baghdad (Malmîsanij, 1999; Ünal,
2008; Kutlay, 2009; Bajalan, 2016).
Consequently, although still displaying considerable interest in the fate of the
Ottoman Balkans, the tone adopted by the KSMP’s bulletin was more
optimistic than that adopted by Kürdistan a decade earlier. For example, in an
article examining the situation in Ottoman Macedonia, published in its first
issue, the author wrote:
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Four months ago [i.e. before the revolution] our foreign policy (siyaset-i
hariciyemiz) was a game of European ambitions and interests. We could
only secure a position within that clash of interests. Discussions amongst
the Great Powers had even begun with regards to separating off, under
the name of the “Three Provinces” (Vilayat-i Selase), the three provinces
of Rumelia, namely the provinces of Salonika, Kosovo, and Manastır
(Bitola), and placing them under international observation and an
autonomous administration, because of our tardiness in doing the
necessary things for the interests and needs of the country. Rumelia’s
current political situation has… undergone a significant change… [due
to the revolution and implementation of the constitution]19
Clearly, it was believed that such a change would herald a new era for Rumelia
as the new government would be more active in implementing necessary
reforms. At the same time, the author identified the Kurds, through the use of
terms such as “our foreign policy” and “our tardiness”, with the Ottoman state
in its entirety.
Unfortunately, from the Ottoman perspective, the revolution did not terminate
the empire’s troubles in Europe. The Austrian annexation of BosniaHerzegovina and the Bulgarian declaration of independence were particularly
humiliating blows. These two acts triggered a wave of popular protest amongst
Ottoman Muslims, which took the form of a boycott of Austrian and Bulgarian
goods, orchestrated by the CUP.20 The KSMP wholeheartedly embraced the
campaign, commending Istanbul’s Kurdish community for participating in the
protest.21 The association also supported efforts to prevent Greece from seizing
control of the island of Crete. In a “special article” entitled Girid Meselesi (The
Cretan Question), accompanied by a photograph of the Cretan town of Hanye
(Chania), the author pointed out that Bulgaria’s declaration of independence
and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had “upset this great [Ottoman]
nation with the deepest hurtful memories.” However, “this time…”, the author
continued:
Greece’s annexation policy towards Crete has awoken holy feelings and
righteousness in every upstanding Ottoman. Hence, in order to protest
against Greece, a demonstration was held, and everyone took an oath in
the name of God, their honour and their conscience that they would
sacrifice their lives in this cause [of Muslim Crete].22

E.A, “Siyasiyat” Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (5 December 1908) [Emphasis added].
One of the principal goods the movement boycotted were Austrian-made fezzes, leading to the movement
often being known as the “fez boycott”. See Çetinkaya (2010: 47-107).
21 See Anonymous, “Tahrim” Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (5 December 1908); Anonymous, “Dahili”, Kürd
Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (12 December 1908).
22 Anonymous, “Makale-i Mahsuse” Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (9 January 1909).
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The article was followed by the text of a speech given in the name of the KSMP
at the demonstration.23 The KSMP’s Ottoman patriotism is unambiguous.
Although the organisation was Kurdish-oriented, it identified Kurdish interests
with those of the Muslim Ottoman polity as a whole. As Babanzade Ismail
Hakkı Bey succinctly put it, the Kurdish identity was “before everything
Islamic.”24
Despite the hopes of the revolutionaries that constitutional rule would stabilise
the empire, the new regime was faced not only with ongoing troubles in the
Balkans, but also growing internal discord. In spring 1909, discontent with the
new government and its CUP backers exploded in open revolt. In April, troops
stationed in Istanbul mutinied against their officers and with the support of
anti-CUP elements, both liberal and conservative, forced the CUP out of the
capital city. This “counter-revolution” was soon put down by troops
sympathetic to the CUP. However, the liberal phase of the revolution was over.
The Ottoman government adopted a host of new laws and regulations
restricting the civil liberties of Ottoman subjects. This included the adoption of
a “Law on Associations” which, although not banning “national associations”
outright, forbade them from engaging with “political questions” (Toprak, 1985:
206-207; Arslan, 2010: 57-70). Consequently, those Kurdish associations
founded after 1909, most notably the KSHS, generally sought to remain within
the letter of the law. In practice this meant focusing primarily on social and
educational issues, while avoiding politically sensitive issues of high politics
(Malmîsanij, 2002; Bajalan, 2013).
Nevertheless, the outbreak of the First Balkan War in autumn 1913 was of great
significance to imperial politics and impacted deeply upon the Kurds.
Numerous individuals of Kurdish origin were drafted into the Ottoman
military. Indeed, the government deployed the predominantly Kurdish Hamidiye
regiments, which had been reconstituted as the “Tribal Light Cavalry” (Aşiret
Hafif Süvari) in 1910, to the European front in 1912 (Klein, 2011: 111). In
February 1912, former KSMP president and Ottoman Senator, Sheikh
Abdülkadir Efendi, even issued a proclamation calling on Kurds to join the
Ottoman military.25 Hence the Balkan War, far from being seen as a distant
conflict, was one in which many individuals of Kurdish origins actively
participated. This is reflected in some of the articles found in the Ottoman
Kurdish press. For example, the KSHS publication, Rojê Kurd (Kurdish Day),
carried an article describing the heroic service rendered by Kurdish soldiers in
the Balkan Wars.26 Another article, an obituary for Hüseyin Pasha Bedirhani,
Süleymaniyeli Hüseyin Paşazade Süleyman Beyefendi, “Suret-i Nutuk” Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (9
January 1909).
24 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Kürdler ve Kürdistan” Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (5 December 1908).
25 PRO FO 195/2449, Pera (24 February 1913).
26 Abu Rewşan, “Kürdlüğün Menakib-i Hamasetinden İki Semasi Besalet” Rojê Kurd (12 September 1913).
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noted with appreciation his (unsuccessful) efforts to raise a 40,000 strong
volunteer force from amongst the Kurds to fight in Europe.27 The wives and
daughters of Kurdish elites in Istanbul also mobilised to support the war effort.
Some wrote more generally about the severe economic and social problems of
Muslim refugees fleeing the warzone. However, they also offered a “Kurdish”
perspective on events. For example, one Kurdish writer in the journal Kadınlar
Dünyası (Women’s World), Fato Nali, penned an article on the unfortunate fate
of a Kurdish veteran of the war who had, after a period in enemy captivity,
suffered severe health problems (Kutlar, 2010: 66-68).
Perhaps one of the most interesting insights into the attitudes of Kurdish
intellectuals to the Balkan War can be found in a short pamphlet entitled Edirne
Sukûtunun İç Yüzü (The Inside Story of the Fall of Edirne). The piece was
published by Celadet Ali and Kamuran Bedirhan and contained a foreword
from Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, by this stage a well-respected member of the
Ottoman Kurdish community in the capital. It opened in the most dramatic of
terms:
From the Balkans smoke and flames arose. Our heads turned and our
eyes were struck by the smoke and flames in front of us. The bayonets
of the Bulgarians were directed towards Çatalca, [those of the] Serbs
towards Üsküp, [those of the] Greeks towards Salonika and [those of
the] Montenegrins towards the stones of İşkodra. We awoke. We suffered
500,000 casualties [and] one in five died from bullet wounds. 500,000
Rumelians (Rumelili) were made refugees… (Bedirhan & Bedirhan, 2009:
20) [Emphasis added].
The introduction continued by laying the blame for the defeat at the feet of not
only the government but all Ottomans who had ignored the situation in the
Balkans. It concluded by proclaiming: “We appeal to all coreligionist and
compatriots who would read these lines of ours. For the love of homeland, in
the name of the spirit of belief… may they recite with enmity and revenge in
their hearts, ‘the Ottoman order shall remain, and Islam shall endure’”
(Bedirhan & Bedirhan, 2009: 24).
The text, completed in July 1913, implicitly took the CUP-led government to
task for its conduct in the First Balkan War and, more specifically, its failure to
protect the former Ottoman capital of Edirne. Yet, while written in a critical
spirit, it was also an unequivocal demonstration of the deeply held commitment
to the continuation of the Ottoman polity by elements of the Ottoman Kurdish
elite. Indeed, the brothers had a strong personal connection to the war due to
the fact that their older brother, Ahmed Süreyya Bedirhan, an Ottoman military
officer, had been captured by the Greeks (Kutlar, 2010: 68). In summation, the
27
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Ottoman Empire’s military defeats and the end of its once vast European
empire, far from being a source of inspiration, was a development to be
mourned.

Conclusion
As outlined in the introduction to this article, it would be a mistake to assume
that the collapse of Ottoman rule in Europe elicited a uniform response
amongst the Kurds. However, perhaps more significantly, it will also hopefully
be evident that the relationship between the nascent Kurdish movement and
imperial collapse was not quite as straightforward as might first be expected.
While some elements within Ottoman Kurdish society evidently regarded the
collapse of Ottoman control in Europe as being a potential opportunity for
Kurdish emancipation from “Turkish” rule, others, including most significantly
those at the forefront of the Kurdish movement, regarded the Kurds’ interests
as being inextricably linked to the fate of the Ottoman polity as a whole. This
realisation should attune us to the fact that the growth of national
consciousness does not automatically translate into demands for a nation-state
and the political appeal of being a member of a broader multi-ethnic polity was
not as weak as it is often portrayed. It should also call into question the
“nationalistic” logic of much historical writing as well as political punditry
within the Middle Eastern context.
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